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Figure 1 
Mode of Power, Confidence, Ideology and Forward-Looking Capitalization 
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Figure 2 
Stock Market Prices 
www.bnarchives.net
+67% from bottom
+62% from bottom
+93% from bottom
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Indices denote month-end closing prices. They are 
expressed in $U.S. and rebased with January 2002=100. The last 
data points are for April 30, 2010. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) for the 
world stock market index; TOTMKUS(PI) for the U.S. stock 
market index; FINANUS(PI) for the U.S. FIRE index).  
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Figure 3 
Capitalization Formulae 
Or why stock prices are delinked from past and present profit 
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Figure 4 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1871-2010 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Monthly earnings are interpolated 
from annual data before 1926 and from quarterly data after 1926. 
Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing prices. Both 
series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with September 
1929=100. The last data points are March 2010 for earnings per 
share and May 2010 for price.  
  
SOURCE: Robert Shiller 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, retrieved 
on May 20, 2010).  
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Table 1 
S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the 
Annual Rates of Growth of Price and Earnings per Share 
(Monthly data expressed as 3-year moving Averages) 
 
 
PERIOD 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
Jan 1873 – Oct 1917 + 0.72 
Oct 1917 – Mar 2010 + 0.35 
 Oct 1917 – Dec 1929 + 0.29 
 Dec 1929 – Feb 1939 + 0.89 
 Feb 1939 – Sep 2000 – 0.15 
Su
b 
pe
rio
ds
 
 Sep 2000 – Mar 2010 + 0.64 
 
 
SOURCE: Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Bondsman’s Fear of Death 
 
“For this consciousness [of the capitalist bound to the steering wheel of a 
megamachine gone wild] was not in peril and fear for this element or that 
[such as falling profit or rising volatility], nor for this or that moment of time 
[like a sharp market correction or a declaration of war], it was afraid for its 
entire being; it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master [the ultimate wrath of 
the ruled]. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has 
trembled throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has 
quaked within it [will capitalism survive?]”. 
 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (London and 
New York: George Allen & Unwin and Humanities Press, 1971), p. 237 
(with square brackets added) 
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Figure 5 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1917-1952 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Monthly earnings are interpolated 
from annual data before 1926 and from quarterly data after 1926. 
Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing prices. Both 
series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with September 
1929=100.  
 
SOURCE: Robert Shiller (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 6 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1970-2010 
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(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Monthly earnings are interpolated 
from quarterly data. Stock price data are monthly averages of daily 
closing prices. Both series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with 
December 2007=100. The last data points are March 2010 for 
earnings per share and May 2010 for price.  
 
SOURCE: Robert Shiller (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 7 
World Equities: Price and Earnings per Share, 1973-2010 
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(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Indices denote month-end closing prices. They are 
expressed in $U.S. and rebased with January 1986=100. Earnings 
per share denote net profits per share earned in the previous twelve 
months The last data points are for April 30, 2010. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) for the 
stock market index; TOTMKWD(PE) for earnings per share).  
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Is the Dominant Ideology Broken? 
 
Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan (2008)  
The whole intellectual edifice . . . collapsed in the summer of last year. . . . 
[T]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to 
protect shareholder’s equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked 
disbelief. Such counterparty surveillance is a central pillar of our financial 
markets’ state of balance. If it fails, as occurred this year, market stability is 
undermined.  
 
Bernie Sucher of Merrill Lynch, quoted in Financial Times (March 2009)  
Our world is broken – and I honestly don’t know what is going to replace it.  
 
Gillian Tett, Financial Times (March 2009) 
[T]he pillars of faith on which this new financial capitalism were built have 
all but collapsed, [and that collapse] has left everyone from finance minister 
or central banker to small investor or pension holder bereft of an intellectual 
compass, dazed and confused. 
  
Editors, Financial Times (May 2009) 
Uncertainty is the only certain thing in this crisis. . . . [A] dense fog of 
confusion has . . . descended, obscuring where we are – falling fast, slowly, 
bumping along the bottom, or finally turning the corner. . . . Are these 
downward blips in a gathering recovery or signs of a return to freefall? The 
answer is: no one knows. Mervyn King, Bank of England governor, is 
forthright: “Judging the balance of influences on the economy at the 
moment is extraordinarily difficult”. . . . Economies are behaving 
unpredictably and will continue to do so. The instability is both cause and 
consequence of the great uncertainty that has been spreading out from the 
financial markets. Fearful and confused, people react erratically to changing 
news, reinforcing confused market behavour. It doesn’t help that our 
economic theories were constructed for a different world. Most models 
depict economies close to equilibrium. . . . And unlike what most models 
assume, prices are not properly clearing all markets. . . . 
 
Gillian Tett, Financial Times (April 2010) 
Three years ago, it seemed inconceivable that a country such as Greece 
would be allowed to default, or exit the eurozone. But back then it seemed 
equally hard to imagine that Lehman Brothers might fail. Now that Lehman 
has gone, who knows what the worst-case scenario might be? Could the 
eurozone break up? Could Greece default? What might happen to other 
debt-laden nations, such as the US, if the worst case scenario occurred? The 
one thing that is clear is that the answers to those questions now depend as 
much on culture and politics as on macro-economics. . . . In this new world 
of sovereign risk, what really matters is a set of issues that cannot be plugged 
into a spreadsheet. The old compass no longer works. 
 
